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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD.OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Bharat, Kevin Facility: Mid-State CF 
NYSID: 








Victor Knapp, Esq. 
125-10 Queens Boulevard 
Suite 323 
Kew Gardens, NY 11415 
05-024-19 B 
April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18 months. 
Berliner, Demosthenes 
Appellant's Briefrece~ved October 4, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Repo1t, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Fo1m 9026); COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
· he undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_ Va.cated, remanded fo r de novo interview _ Modified to ____ _ 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to-----
_Vacated, remanded for de n~vo interview _Modified to ____ _ 
It the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determ!nation, the rel~ted Statement of th.e Appeals Unit 's Finding~ and the sepp~ate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were matled to the 1:°111ate and the Inmate's Counsel, tf any, on J}dLt f IJoJo@ 
Distribution: Appeals Unit - Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole Fil~ - Central File 
P-2002(B) (1112018) 
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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 18-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant soliciting and exchanging sexually 
explicit photographs with an 8-year-old girl via an online messaging service. Appellant raises the 
following issues: 1) the decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Board failed to consider 
all the relevant statutory factors; 2) the decision failed to comply with the 2011 amendments 
requiring the Board to focus upon the rehabilitation of the Appellant; 3) the decision was not given 
in detail and was conclusory in nature; 4) the Board relied heavily on the nature of the instant 
offense; 5) the Board penalized Appellant for not completing sex offender programming due to 
reasons beyond his control; and 6) the 18-month hold was excessive. These arguments are without 
merit. 
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). In this case, the appellant received an 
EEC, therefore the deprecation standard does not apply here. 
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the 
Board is not required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may 
deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is 
released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo 
v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Use of a Child in a Sexual Performance; 
Appellant’s significant family support; Appellant’s institutional efforts including four Tier II 
tickets, engagement in positive programming including sex offender counseling and passing the 
TASC test, and placement in involuntary protective custody; and release plans to live at a residence 
provided by this father. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case 
plan, the COMPAS instrument, and multiple letters of support. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense, Appellant’s failure to complete 
recommended programming, and Appellant’s lack of insight into the causes of his behavior and the 
way in which he victimized the young girl. See Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 
49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Bush v. Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 
(3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Marcus v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 476, 476, 862 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (3d 
Dept. 2008); Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 1506, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.), lv. 
denied, 32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 763, 
661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997); Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 
704 (2000); Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 
228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901 (2017). The Board also cited the COMPAS 
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instrument’s medium risk for felony violence and arrest. See Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. 
Of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Bush, 148 A.D.3d 
1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 
N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017). The Board acted within its discretion in determining these 
considerations rebutted any presumption created by the EEC and rendered discretionary release 
inappropriate at this time.   See generally Matter of Neal v. Stanford, 131 A.D.3d 1320, 16 N.Y.S.3d 
342 (3d Dept. 2015).   
 
Inasmuch as Appellant contends the Board failed to consider requisite factors, there is a 
presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders.  See 
People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People 
ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d 
Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in 
fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000).   
 
There is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the decision failed to comply with the 2011 
amendments requiring the Board to focus upon his rehabilitation. The 2011 amendments require 
procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release 
decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the 
COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 
(3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 
640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 
30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 
N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be 
the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of 
sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not 
eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by 
considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not 
change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether 
to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular 
result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, 
the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory 
factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera 
v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord 
Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter 
of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what 
occurred here. 
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The Board’s decision also satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board penalized Appellant for not completing sex offender 
programming due to reasons beyond his control is without merit. The Board may consider an 
inmate’s need to complete rehabilitative programming even where a delay in commencement is 
through no fault of the inmate.  See Matter of Barrett v. New York State Div. of Parole, 242 A.D.2d 
763, 661 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dept. 1997). That Appellant is now enrolled, actively participating, and 
making good progress in the Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program does not provide a 
basis to disturb the decision. 
 
Finally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 18 months for discretionary release 
was excessive or improper. It is within the Board’s discretion and authority to hold an inmate for 
up to 24 months, pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter 
of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. 
denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 
A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).   
 
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in 
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”  
Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter of 
Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
